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Abstract
We introduce a new way to model the Bismarckian social insur-
ance system, stressing its corporatist dimension. Comparing the Bev-
eridgean, Bismarckian and Liberal systems according to the majority
voting rule, we show that for a given distribution of risks inside soci-
ety, the Liberal system wins if the inequality of income is low, and the
Beveridgean system wins if the inequality of income is high. Using a
utilitarian criterion, the Beveridgean system always dominates and the
Bismarckian system is preferred to the Liberal one.
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1 Introduction
This paper compares the three main systems of welfare capitalism – Bev-
eridgean, Bismarckian, Liberal – as analyzed by Esping-Andersen (1990)
from both a positive and a normative perspective. To do this, we introduce
a new way to model a Bismarckian type of social insurance to account for
the fact that Bismarckian systems are organized around groups of agents.
We aim to focus on the redistributive design of these different regimes and
compare the preferred systems from both perspectives.
The background for our considerations is the following: In many coun-
tries with a Bismarckian system, such as Germany, Austria, France or Bel-
gium, a variety of social protection funds for illness, occupational injury,
family or pension cover specific groups of people. For instance, the set of
French social insurance funds refers to professional groups such as railway
and public transportation system employees, seamen, civil servants, agri-
cultural workers, entrepreneurs, etc. For occupational injury, the German
insurance system is similarly organized on a professional group basis: Spe-
cific employer’s mutual insurance associations cover the commercial, agri-
cultural or the public sector as well as railway workers, firefighters and local
authority employees etc.1 There are other examples in Bismarckian coun-
tries where the formation of groups are a result of the agents’ choice. For
instance, in Belgium or Germany, people can choose from a (large) range of
health insurance funds. These funds are organized on the level of geographic
coverage, employers, craft guilds, etc.2
The recognition of this organizational and strongly corporatist feature of
the Bismarckian system goes back to the seminal work of Esping-Andersen
(1990): “corporatism was typically built around occupational groups seeking
to uphold [...] status distinctions and used these as the organizational nexus
for society and economy.” (p. 60). To be precise, Esping-Andersen (1990)
clustered welfare states as “conservative”, “social-democratic” and “liberal”
regime types. In line with the established economic literature we retain for
the first two systems the nomenclature of “Bismarckian” and “Beveridgean”
systems.
1German Social Security Law, Book Nr. VII
2In Germany, before the amendment to the Social Security Law in 1996, people had
to insure themselves according to the selection criterion of the health insurance funds.
Therefore, these funds covered only people who exactly matched their selection criterion,
e.g. they lived in a specific geographic region, they worked for a specific employer or in
certain craft guilds etc. Nowadays, people can choose which fund they want to be insured
in, cf. German Social Security Law, Book Nr. V. Further source: www.prospeur.org
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As well as other dimensions, one important aspect that distinguishes
these systems is their degree of income redistribution. Firstly, Liberal sys-
tems are associated with a very low degree of income redistribution since
they mainly encourage private insurance. Secondly, Beveridgean systems,
based on the principles of universality, uniqueness and uniformity of bene-
fits, are associated with a high degree of income redistribution. This is due
to proportional tax rates but flat benefits. Finally, Bismarckian systems are
associated with a lower degree of income redistribution. Most often, they
have been modeled in the literature as a global insurance system, organized
by the state, where individuals pay taxes proportional to their incomes, but
independent of their risks, and receive benefits proportional to their income.
The problem with this way of modeling the Bismarckian system is that
it ignores the “corporatist” attribute of such systems: If individuals are dif-
ferentiated by income and by risk, then a pooling of individuals with specific
risks inside each fund leads to “intra-group horizontal redistribution” in the
Bismarckian system, i.e. it leads to redistribution from low-risk to high-risk
agents inside each fund.3 As a consequence, each fund is characterized by
its specific average risk. Transferred to the level of individual preferences,
this implies that individuals who bear a high risk may benefit from a low
average group risk. In a similar vein, the introduction of both income and
risk heterogeneity of individuals leads to another kind of horizontal redis-
tribution inside the Beveridgean systems: Here, redistribution is based on
individual risk and on the distribution of risks inside the entire society. In
our terminology, this type is called “global horizontal redistribution”and
it complements the usual vertical income redistribution of the Beveridgean
system. Again, transferred to the level of individual preference, poor and/or
high-risk individuals benefit from the Beveridgean system. The Liberal sys-
tem is characterized by neither horizontal nor vertical redistribution, since
it consists of a private insurance mechanism, with a contribution rate that
is proportional to individual risk and income. In the following, we provide
a model which accounts for all of these redistribution patterns by analyzing
individual and aggregate preferences for the three systems.
There are two strands of literature which are related to our model. The
first strand has determined both the type and the size of social insurance
or social security systems, respectively, and therefore refers to the explicit
3In our model, individuals can be thought of being differentiated with respect to risk
along a horizontal axis and with respect to income along a vertical axis. The notion of
“horizontal” refers to the redistribution of risk (i.e. from low-risk to high-risk people) with
two aspects: within the entire society, or within groups. Accordingly, “vertical” refers to
redistribution of income (i.e. from rich to poor people). See also Section 3.2.
3
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distinction between Bismarckian and Beveridgean systems, see Casamatta
et al. (2000b) (for social insurance) and Pestieau (1999) (for social security).
They analyze the optimal size of the system (in terms of the tax rate) with
the type of system chosen at the constitutional stage. Their main result
is that the degree of redistribution affects the political support for the size
of the system.4 Rossignol and Taugourdeau (2004) study both the level of
tax rate and the type of system within a probabilistic model of electoral
competition. They proved that the chosen social insurance system is that
which minimizes the contribution rate for a high relative risk aversion, and
that the reverse is true for a low relative risk aversion. Moreover, Conde-
Ruiz and Profeta (2007) provide an OLG model of social security where the
size and the type of system is determined simultaneously, yet issue-by-issue.
They find that the key determinant which shapes their analytical result is
income inequality: The Beveridgean system can be supported by a coalition
of low and high income individuals.
We complement this first strand of literature in two ways. Firstly, the
Bismarckian system is modeled as a corporatist one, which enables us to dis-
tinguish it more clearly from the Liberal system. Secondly, the choice of the
system is determined alternatively according to a positive and a normative
criterion, that we are able to compare.
The second strand of literature this paper refers to analyzes the link
between income inequality and the level of redistribution inside society. In-
deed, in our model, the degree of inequality of income and the distribution
of risk crucially affect the choice of an agent, which affects the choice of the
system for both positive and normative criteria. The link between income
inequality and redistribution has first been highlighted in the well-known
Meltzer and Richard (1981) general equilibrium model of a labor economy
where the share of redistributed income is determined by majority voting.5
Their main finding is that if mean income rises relative to the income of
the median voter, then redistribution increases. In other words, a more
unequal income distribution leads to more redistribution. In addition to
the standard redistributive mechanism from rich to poor, insurance motives
have also been introduced in the analysis of welfare policies. For instance,
Moene and Wallerstein (2001) show that the redistributive and the insurance
mechanisms work in opposite directions in the sense that support for social
4See also Cremer et al. (2007) for the effect of myopic and non-myopic individuals on
social security.
5In addition, see Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977) on whose results Meltzer and
Richard (1981) build upon.
4
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insurance spending declines with increased income inequality.6 Finally, Kim
(2007) extends the analysis of redistribution based on insurance motives by
introducing a distribution of risks inside the society, where the level of risk
depends on the agent’s sector of activity. The main result of this model is
that political demand for unemployment insurance is clearly influenced by
both the distribution of risks and income.
As already indicated, our model provides a complete differentiation of
individuals along three dimensions: income, individual risk and group risk.
This is a key point of our analysis. In the previous literature, Casamatta
et al. (2000b) introduce heterogeneity of individuals by a one dimensional
differentiation with three discrete levels of income but the same proba-
bility of receiving income or relying on social benefits. Casamatta et al.
(2000a) and Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007) differentiate along two dimen-
sions, namely age (working young vs. retired old) and the level of income
(continuous in Casamatta et al., 2000a, discrete in Conde-Ruiz and Pro-
feta, 2007). A related double differentiation of individuals with regard to
income and likelihood of illness is found in Gouveia (1997) who analyzes the
outcome of majority voting over the public provision of a private good (in
particular, health care).
We concentrate on the case of insurance systems that cover unemploy-
ment, occupational injury or health risks. Individuals earn a wage income in
the good state of the world and receive insurance benefits in the bad state of
the world. Furthermore, they are members of a group which is characterized
by a group-specific risk distribution. This implies that groups can be ranked
according to the average risk of its members. We incorporate into our anal-
ysis a Liberal insurance system reflecting an actuarial fair private insurance,
a Beveridgean system involving redistribution for the entire society and a
Bismarckian system comprising redistribution between high-risk and low-
risk individuals within a group. In a two stage model, first, the system of
insurance is decided and second, the level of the tax rate is determined. The
choice of the tax rate and the choice of the system are determined according
to a positive criterion, then compared to a normative one.
In the following we show that by majority voting, the Liberal system
wins if the inequality of income is low and the Beveridgean system wins
6Moene and Wallerstein (2001) focus on the impact of income inequality on the support
of welfare spending when welfare benefits are targeted towards the employed or the un-
employed. See also Iversen and Soskice (2001) for a similar model analyzing social policy
preferences which depend on different types of skill investments reflecting unemployment
risks. Be´nabou (2000) analyzes the impact of inequality and redistributive policies that
enhance efficiency within a stochastic growth model.
5
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if the inequality of income is high. Employing a utilitarian criterion, the
Beveridgean system dominates both the Bismarckian and Liberal systems
but the Bismarckian system is preferred to the Liberal one.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model. In
Section 3 we analyze the pairwise preferences of individuals and determine
the type of welfare system chosen by majority voting. In Section 4 we
analyze the outcome of a utilitarian social planner and compare the results
of both criteria. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The model
The society is divided into groups which are denoted by k = 1, . . . ,M and
there are Nk members per Group k.
7 There are N agents in the society with
N =
∑M
k=1Nk. An agent i of Group k has an income wi and a risk pi to lose
this income. A high level of pi implies that agent i is risky in terms of bad
health or unemployment, for instance. Each group k is characterized by a
specific distribution function of risk fk. To concentrate our analysis on the
heterogeneity of the distribution of risk, we suppose that the distribution
function of income g is similar in each group. Moreover, for the sake of the
readability of our results, we assume that the distribution of incomes and
risks are independent. Therefore, groups are heterogeneous with respect to
risks but homogeneous with respect to income distribution. We now describe
the distribution of income and risk in more detail.
2.1 Distributions of income and risk
The distribution of income for each group is represented by the probabil-
ity density function g defined on [winf ;wsup] with average income w =∫
wg (w) dw. The function g is positively skewed such that median income
wm is lower than average income w. Income levels can then be ranked as
0 ≤ winf ≤ wm ≤ w ≤ wsup.
The distribution of risk depends on the group k and implies a group-
specific risk probability density function fk defined on [0; 1]. This function fk
is positively skewed, as well, and produces a particular intra-group average
risk pk, where pk =
1
Nk
∫
pfk(p)dp and Nk =
∫
fk(p)dp with fk ≥ 0. Let f be
the risk probability density function of the entire society, i.e. f =
∑M
k=1 fk.
7These groups could be professional groups (e.g. the service sector, the agricultural
sector, the industrial sector etc.) or other types of groups.
6
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We normalize N = 1 =
∫
f . The average risk in the entire society is
p =
∫
pf(p)dp.
We assume that the intra-group average risks are ranked as
p1 < p2 < p3 < . . . < pM (1)
In addition, we postulate that pm,k = pm for every k, i.e. the median
risk of each group pm,k corresponds to the median risk in society pm, even
if the distribution of risk inside each group is different.
How can we justify these two assumptions? It is clear that there is
a majority of low-risk people in each group. It is reasonable to assume
that the groups are mainly differentiated by the distribution of their high-
risk members. This implies that the groups have different average risks pk
(i.e. p1 < ... < pM ), but approximatively similar median risks pm,k (i.e.
pm,k = pm for every k).
Finally, based on the positive skewness of function fk, we now postulate
∀k, pm < pk
which implies pm < p.
In the following, we will present empirical justification for the relation-
ship between median risk and average risk.
2.2 Empirical evidence
It is a well-known stylized fact that income distributions in many developed
countries exhibit positive skewness, see, e.g. Neal and Rosen (2000).8 To
establish the positive skewness of the risk distribution we can refer to the
same line of argument as before: We want to show that there is a majority of
low-risk and a minority of high-risk members in each group. In our model,
risk refers to the probability of having to rely on (social) insurance benefits
due to unemployment or illness. We provide for each of these risk factors
an empirically observable proxy.
For unemployment we compare median and average duration of unem-
ployment using data from OECD countries for the years 2000 to 2010.9 We
find that the proportion of countries where median duration of unemploy-
ment is clearly smaller than average duration is substantial for the whole
8Early contributions to the literature analyzing functional forms of earnings capacities
are Staele (1942), Miller (1955), or Harrison (1981).
9For reasons of comparability across all OECD countries we chose unemployment rates
of male work force.
7
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time period, see Figure 1. Overall, less than 5% of total observations exhibit
a reverse relationship with average risk lower than median risk.10
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
median duration < average duration interval median = interval average median duration > average duration 
Figure 1: Median vs. average duration of unemployment in OECD countries,
proportions of countries relative to all OECD countries, 2000–2010, male
work force.
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics, own calculations.
For illness our basic hypothesis is that people affected by chronic health
problems or disability bear a higher risk of having to rely on insurance
payments. Since these people constitute a minority in society, average risk
will be lower than median risk. Indeed, data from OECD (2010b) shows
that the self-assessed prevalence of chronic health problems or disability is
lower than 15% on OECD average for the whole working age population.
Even for age group 50–64, the proportion of people with self-assessed chronic
health problems or disability is lower than 25% on average and only for few
countries a little higher than 30%. Given a minority of people bearing a
high risk due to chronic health problems and disabilities, the majority of
people has quite a low risk.
Moreover, if we consider health expenditures as a proxy of the health
risk, then it clearly appears that mean health expenditures are consistently
higher than median health expenditures (Jung and Tran, 2010).
10Data from OECD (2010a). Estimation of median and average duration of unemploy-
ment and calculations of average duration of unemployment are available from the authors
upon request.
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2.3 The three systems
The agent i earns with probability (1− pi) an income wi which is subject to a
payroll tax t, such that (1− t)wi is his net of tax income. With probability
pi the agent receives social insurance benefits bi which, in the case of a
Beveridgean system (BE), are identical for all agents bi = b
BE . In the case
of the Bismarckian system (BI), social insurance benefits bi are proportional
to individual income but the coefficient of proportionality is identical for all
agents inside the group k, i.e. bi = b
BI
k (wi) = ck · wi. Finally, in the case
of a Liberal system (L), benefits that an agent receives in the bad state of
the world are actuarially computed, based on both his risk pi and the wage
wi that he would receive in the good state of the world, i.e. bi = b
L (pi, wi).
No redistribution occurs in this last system.
Hence, under the Liberal system, the budget constraint for each agent i
is given by (1− pi) twi = pibL(pi, wi) which immediately implies
bL (pi, wi) =
1− pi
pi
twi
Under the Bismarckian system, the budget constraint in Group k is
1
Nk
∫∫
((1− p)tw) fk(p)g (w) dpdw = 1Nk
∫∫
pbBIk (w) fk(p)g (w) dpdw
and since bBIk (wi) = ck · wi it implies
1
Nk
∫∫
((1− p)tw) fk(p)g (w) dpdw = 1Nk
∫∫
pckwfk(p)g (w) dpdw
thus ck =
1−pk
pk
t, and finally
bBIk (wi) =
1− pk
pk
twi
Lastly, under the Beveridgean system, the social insurance budget constraint
satisfies the identity
∫∫
((1−p)tw)f(p)g (w) dpdw = ∫∫ pbBEf(p)g (w) dpdw,
which implies
bBE =
1− p
p
tw
with p =
∫
pf(p)dp.
The welfare function under the Beveridgean system, for an individual i
of risk pi if the tax rate is t, is now:
WBE(t, pi, wi) = (1− pi)U((1− t)wi) + piU
(
1− p
p
tw
)
Analogously, the group-specific welfare function for the Bismarckian system
for a member i of Group k, is
WBIk (t, pi, wi) = (1− pi)U((1− t)wi) + piU
(
1− pk
pk
twi
)
9
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and the welfare function of an agent i under the Liberal system is:
WL(t, pi,wi) = (1− pi)U((1− t)wi) + piU
(
1− pi
pi
twi
)
We aim to determine the preferred system according to two alternative
criteria, i.e. a positive one, majority voting and a normative one, utilitarian
criterion. In both cases, the timing of decisions is as follows: In the first
stage, the welfare system is chosen. In the second stage, the level of the tax
rate is chosen, according to the studied criterion. We will solve these games
by backward induction.
For the sake of simplicity we specify the utility function to be U(x) =
lnx.
3 Majority voting
3.1 Choice of tax rate
Maximizing the level of the welfare of a given agent i with respect to the
tax rate ti yields the same preferred tax rate under the three systems:
t∗i = pi (2)
The preferred tax rate does not depend on income. Moreover, since agents
are differentiated by their risk pi, their preferences are single peaked with
respect to the tax rate. As a result, according to the majority rule, the tax
rates that are chosen in both the Beveridgean and Bismarckian systems are
those preferred by the median voter, i.e.:
t∗BE = t
∗
m = pm
t∗BI = t
∗
m,k = pm,k
Since all groups have approximately similar median risks pm,k (i.e. pm,k =
pm for any k), the tax rate chosen by majority voting corresponds to the
choice of the society’s median agent and is the same in both the Beveridgean
and Bismarckian systems
t∗BE = t
∗
BI = t
∗
m = pm
In the Liberal system the choice of tax rate is made independently by
each agent and corresponds to his personal level of risk11
t∗L = t
∗
i = pi
11For the sake of simplicity we refer to the term “tax rate” also with regard to the
Liberal system. “Contribution rate” would be a more precise term.
10
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Incorporating the chosen tax rates in the welfare functions gives:
WBE(t∗m, pi, wi) = (1− pi) ln((1− pm)wi) + pi ln
(
1− p
p
pmw
)
(3)
WBIk (t
∗
m, pi, wi) = (1− pi) ln((1− pm)wi) + pi ln
(
1− pk
pk
pmwi
)
(4)
WL(t∗i , pi, wi) = (1− pi) ln((1− pi)wi) + pi ln
(
1− pi
pi
piwi
)
= ln ((1− pi)wi) (5)
3.2 Individual preferences on the system
Before determining the system that would be chosen by majority voting,
we need to study individual preferences for the systems using the tax rates
we have just determined. We focus on a pairwise comparison of the three
systems to have a complete ranking of the systems for each agent.
3.2.1 Bismarck or Beveridge?
We start by comparing the Beveridgean and Bismarckian systems with the
tax rates obtained by majority voting.
Proposition 1.
Agent i of Group k prefers a Beveridgean system to a Bismarckian one
iff wi < rkw, where rk =
1−p
p
pk
1−pk is an increasing function of pk, and thus
of k.
This agent prefers the Bismarckian system iff wi > rkw.
Proof. From Equations (3) and (4)
WBE(t∗m, pi, wi) > W
BI
k (t
∗
m, pi, wi)
⇐⇒
pi ln
(
1− p
p
pmw
)
> pi ln
(
1− pk
pk
pmwi
)
which is equivalent to
1− p
p
w >
1− pk
pk
wi
i.e. equivalent to wi < rkw, where rk is clearly an increasing function of pk,
and pk is an increasing function of k according to Inequality (1). 
11
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Note that the coefficient rk is a measure of the average risk pk in Group
k, relative to the average risk of society, p. If the average risk in Group k
coincides with the society’s average risk, then rk is equal to 1. If the average
risk in Group k is lower (higher) than the society’s average risk, then rk is
strictly smaller (larger) than 1. Since rk is an increasing function of k, we
can write:
r1 < r2 < . . . < rj < 1 < rj+1 < . . . < rM
With the usual way of modeling the Bismarckian system, there is only one
group, i.e. M = 1. In this case, p1 = p so that r1 = 1. It immediately
implies that an agent of income wi prefers a Beveridgean system if wi < w
and a Bismarckian one if wi > w. It is a particular case of our Proposition
1.
With the more realistic way of modeling the Bismarckian system that
we adopt here, the Bismarckian system is particularly interesting for agents
who belong to low-risk groups, i.e. to Group k with k low. Agents who
bear a high risk benefit from a group with a low mean risk because of the
intra-group horizontal redistribution.
Both the Beveridgean and the Bismarckian systems imply horizontal
redistribution (i.e. from low-risk to high-risk agents), but the only system
with vertical redistribution (i.e. from rich to poor agents) is the Beveridgean
one. Thus, poor agents prefer Beveridge to Bismarck.
An individual i prefers a Beveridgean system if his income wi is such that
wi < rkw, as shown in Figure 2. In each group, there may be a proportion
of agents who prefer the Beveridgean system and another that prefer the
Bismarckian one. The proportion of agents who prefer the Beveridgean
system increases with the average risk of the group. As a consequence,
according to the ranking of the pk, the proportion of agents who prefer a
Beveridgean system is the lowest in Group 1 and the highest in Group M .
Note that the individual choice of the system only depends on the group
the individual belongs to, and on his individual income wi, but not on his
individual risk pi. Finally, every agent of Group k prefers a Beveridgean
system if
wsup < rkw
which is more likely to be true for high k (that is for a high average risk),
whereas every agent prefers a Bismarckian system if
winf > rkw
which is more likely to be true for low k (that is for a low average risk).
12
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BI System 
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Figure 2: Individual preferences: BE or BI?
3.2.2 Bismarck or Liberal?
Now we compare the Bismarckian and Liberal systems. An agent i of Group
k prefers a Bismarckian system if
WBIk (t
∗
m, pi, wi) > W
L(t∗i , pi, wi)
which leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2.
Agent i of Group k prefers a Bismarckian system to a Liberal one iff pi >
p̂k, where p̂k only depends on the group of the agent, and is an increasing
function of k.
This agent prefers the Liberal system iff pi < p̂k
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Note that the choice between L and BI does not depend on the income
earned by the agent in the good state of the world, because in both systems
there is no vertical redistribution.
A Bismarckian system implies intra-group horizontal redistribution (i.e.
from low-risk to high-risk agents) in opposition to the Liberal system. As
13
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Figure 3: Individual preferences: L or BI?
a result, high-risk people prefer the Bismarckian system to the Liberal one.
For a given agent of risk pi, the Bismarckian system is more interesting if
the other agents of the group are low risk. If k is low (i.e. pk low), Group k
is a very low-risk group. It is then interesting to have a Bismarckian system
for an agent of this group, as it appears in Figure 3.
3.2.3 Beveridge or Liberal?
Now we compare the Beveridgean and Liberal systems. An agent i prefers
the Beveridgean system iff
WBE(t∗m, pi, wi) > W
L(t∗i , pi, wi)
which leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3.
Agent i prefers a Beveridgean system to a Liberal one iff wi < ŵ(pi)
where ŵ(pi) is an increasing function of pi, with ŵ(0) = 0 and ŵ(1) = +∞
This agent prefers the Liberal system iff wi > ŵ(pi)
14
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Proof. See Appendix B. 
Figure 4 presents the partition of the population between those who
prefer a Liberal system and those who prefer a Beveridgean system. The
preference depends both on the income and the risk supported by the agent.
The curve representing the function ŵ characterizes the boundary between
both regimes. Therefore, a combination of income and risk on the boundary
makes the agent indifferent to both regimes.
An agent i of income wi and risk pi prefers a Beveridgean system against
a Liberal one iff wi < ŵ(pi), where ŵ is an increasing function of pi. Agents
with a sufficiently high income and relatively low risk prefer the Liberal
system. Agents with a sufficiently low income and relatively high risk prefer
the Beveridgean system because they benefit from vertical and horizontal
redistributions.
! 
p
! 
1
! 
w 
! 
L > BE
! 
ˆ w 
! 
ˆ p 
L < BE
w
wˆ(pi )
Figure 4: Individual preferences: L or BE?
A Beveridgean system implies both global horizontal and vertical (i.e.
from rich to poor agents) redistribution. Both high-risk and/or poor agents
have an incentive to choose a Beveridgean system to benefit from redistribu-
tion. Conversely, low-risk and/or rich agents benefit more from supporting
their preferred tax rate. In addition, these agents do not benefit from redis-
tribution. Therefore, they are in favor of a Liberal system.
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3.2.4 Summary of individual preferences
Overall, there are three types of redistribution mechanisms which essentially
determine individual preferences. They are summarized in Table 1.
Redistribution mechanism Effective in
Vertical redistribution BE
Global horizontal redistribution BE
Intra-group horizontal redistribution BI
Table 1: Summary of redistribution mechanisms
Figure 5 gives an overview of the partition functions for individual pref-
erences for a given Group k. Firstly, the Beveridgean system is clearly
preferred by agents who are characterized by a combination of very low
income and very high risk. However, Beveridge is also preferred by poor
agents who support a relatively small risk if the “income effect” of a high
vertical redistribution dominates.
w	

p	

L > BI > BE	

L > BE > BI	

BE > BI > L	

BI > BE > L	

BI > L > BE	

k +1	

BI
 =
 L	

BE = BI	

BE > L > BI	

BI System	
 L System	
 BE System	

k+1	

L =
BE
	

Figure 5: Overview of partition functions for individual preferences
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Secondly, the Liberal system is preferred by agents with a low risk, from
the “quite rich” to the very rich agents because low-risk agents are against
horizontal redistribution and rich agents are against vertical redistribution.
However, a Liberal system is also preferred by poor agents who have a very
low risk: If this “low-risk effect” dominates the income effect from vertical
redistribution inside the Beveridgean system, then these agents also prefer
Liberal to Beveridge. The additional advantage of a Liberal system is that
the tax rate is not chosen by a decision-maker, but is the one preferred by
the agent.
Thirdly, agents are in favor of a Bismarckian system if they are suffi-
ciently rich and have a level of risk beyond a certain threshold since the
Bismarckian system features intra-group horizontal redistribution but no
vertical redistribution.
The impact of a higher group risk on the partition space of individual
preferences can be seen by considering preferences of Group k+1. Compared
to Group k, the indifference curves of agents in this group will move for
BE = BI upwards and for BI = L to the right. This is indicated in Figure
5. As a consequence, the space where the Bismarckian system is preferred
becomes smaller because a Bismarckian system is more favorable for lower
group risk.
3.3 Choice of the system under majority voting
Before studying the choice of a utilitarian planner we first focus on a simple
positive decision rule: majority voting. We restrict our analysis to pairwise
comparisons of the choice of the systems. Note that there is not necessarily
unanimity within a group regarding a preferred system.
3.3.1 Bismarck or Beveridge?
In the following we define as the “poor” those agents whose income is lower
than the average income (wi < w) and as the “rich” those agents who have
a higher-than-average income (wi > w) . We study the impact of a “mean
preserving spread” (hereafter referred to as MPS).12 This means that rich
people become richer, poor people become poorer, but the average income
remains unchanged.
Recall that the indicator of risk of Group k relative to society’s risk, rk, is
ranked as follows: r1 < ... < rj < 1 < rj+1 < ... < rM
12Note that an MPS is related to second-order stochastic dominance, this is well defined
in Mas-Colell et al. (1995), chapter 6.D.
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Proposition 4.
(i) If the inequality of income is low, i.e. here, if rjw < winf < wsup <
rj+1w, then in Groups 1, 2, ..., j, there is unanimity in favor of the Bis-
marckian system, and in Groups j + 1, ..., M , there is unanimity in favor
of the Beveridgean system.
(ii) A Mean Preserving Spread (MPS) of the distribution of incomes
implies a lower political support for the Bismarckian system in Groups 1,
..., j, and a lower political support for the Beveridgean system in Groups
j + 1, ..., M .
(iii) With a sufficiently large MPS, there is a majority in favor of the
Beveridgean system.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
The decisive factor which determines the type of system is income in-
equality.
An interpretation of this Proposition is as follows:
(i) If the inequality of income is low, the impact of vertical redistribution
can be neglected. In this case, comparing BI and BE systems means that
two different types of horizontal redistribution are compared: intra-group
horizontal redistribution in the BI system and global horizontal redistribu-
tion in the BE system. The intra-group horizontal redistribution is more
favorable for groups 1, ..., j because for them pk < p holds true. Therefore,
each member in these groups prefers a BI system.
The reverse is true for groups j + 1, ...,M : They benefit more from
global horizontal redistribution since p < pk. Consequently, all agents in
these groups prefer a BE system.
(ii) Let us consider Groups 1, ..., j after an MPS. The rich agents of these
groups will still prefer the BI system. The same is true for the “rather”
poor people, because they benefit from their low intra-group risk pk in the
BI system. The poorest people become even poorer with the MPS, so that
they finally prefer BE because it allows vertical redistribution.
For agents who belong to Groups j + 1, ...,M , again, the reverse is true.
With an MPS, the poor agents of these groups will still prefer BE, and
also the “rather” rich people. The richest agents become even richer with
the MPS, so that they finally prefer BI because it does not imply vertical
redistribution. Therefore, if a majority of people belongs to Groups 1, ..., j,
then BI is adopted by majority voting. BE is adopted if the reverse is true.
(iii) In case of a very large inequality of income (i.e. very large MPS), the
effect of vertical redistribution dominates horizontal redistribution: people
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with an income wi lower than w almost all prefer BE. Then, there is a
majority for BE since wm < w.
This effect is in line with the result from Meltzer and Richard (1981)
which states that when the share of redistributed income is determined by
majority voting, a more unequal income distribution leads to more redistri-
bution.
3.3.2 Bismarck or Liberal?
We now focus on the choice between a Bismarckian and a Liberal system.
The inequality of income has no impact on the political support of the Lib-
eral system against the Bismarckian one, because in both systems the social
benefit is proportional to the income, i.e. there is no vertical redistribution.
Recall we have assumed that the median voter is the same in each group,
i.e. pm,k = pm for every k.
Proposition 5.
According to the majority voting criterion a Liberal system is adopted
against a Bismarckian one.
Proof. We can set
hk (pm) = W
BI
k (t
∗
m, pm, wi)−WL(t∗i , pm, wi) = pm ln
(
1− pk
pk
pm
1− pm
)
Since pm,k = pm for every k, and pm < pk for every k, then hk (pm) < 0.
From Proposition 2 and its proof, we are then able to state that for all
agents i with pi 6 pm, that represent at least 50% of the voters of each
group, the Liberal system is preferred. 
The main advantage of the Liberal system is that agents can choose
their individually preferred tax rate. The main advantage of the Bismarckian
system is intra-group horizontal redistribution; however, this advantage only
applies to a minority of people. As a result, the Liberal system is preferred
by a majority of agents.
3.3.3 Beveridge or Liberal?
Let us now study the majority choice between the Beveridgean and Liberal
systems.
According to Proposition 3, we know that an agent of income wi and
risk pi prefers the Beveridgean system against the Liberal one iff wi < ŵ(pi).
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The function ŵ depends on pm, p, and w. In the following proposition, we
show that the political support for BE (against L) depends on the level of
inequality of income in the society.
Proposition 6.
(i) If the inequality of income is low, here more precisely, if winfw > η,
where η only depends on the distribution of risks, and 0 < η < 1, then a
majority of agents prefers a Liberal system to a Beveridgean one.
(ii) A Mean Preserving Spread (MPS) of the distribution of income im-
plies a higher political support for the Beveridgean system.
(iii) With a sufficiently large MPS, there is a majority in favor of the
Beveridgean system.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
Again, there is a precise interpretation of this proposition.
(i) If the inequality of income is low, vertical redistribution does not
matter. In this case, BE vs. L means global horizontal redistribution vs. no
redistribution at all. Global horizontal redistribution is in favor of high-risk
agents which are a minority. In turn, there is a majority for the L system.
(ii) The higher the inequality of income, the stronger the vertical redis-
tribution. Poor agents are in favor of vertical redistribution. Since they
constitute more than 50% of the population, the support for BE increases.
(iii) With a sufficiently large inequality of income, the effect of vertical
redistribution dominates, so poor agents will be in favor of BE.
4 Utilitarian criterion
In this section, we focus on a normative criterion, analyzing the choice of a
utilitarian social planner.
4.1 Choice of tax rate
The Liberal system is characterized by total liberty of choice for any indi-
vidual. Similarly to the majority voting analysis, the individually preferred
tax rate is applied, i.e.
t∗L = t
∗
i = pi
Under the Beveridgean system, the utilitarian planner determines the
common optimal tax rate, tBEu , by maximizing the average of the individual
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welfares. Since
UBE =
∫∫
WBE(tBEu , p, w)f(p)g(w)dpdw
=
∫∫ [
(1− p) ln((1− tBEu )w) + p ln
(
1− p
p
tBEu w
)]
f(p)g(w)dpdw
= (1− p) ln(1− tBEu ) + p ln
(
1− p
p
tBEu
)
+ (1− p)lnw + p lnw
where lnw stands for the mean of lnwi. Then max
tBEu
UBE implies t
BE
u = p.
Under the Bismarckian system, the utilitarian planner determines the
optimal tax rate of Group k, tBIu,k, by maximizing the average of the individ-
ual welfares of Group k.13 Since
UBI,k =
1
Nk
∫∫
WBIk (t
BI
u,k, p, w)fk(p)g(w)dpdw
=
1
Nk
∫∫ [
(1− p) ln ((1− tBIu,k)w)+ p ln(1− pkpk tBIu,kw
)]
fk(p)g(w)dpdw
= (1− pk)
[
ln
(
1− tBIu,k
)
+ lnw
]
+ pk ln
(
1− pk
pk
)
+ pk ln t
BI
u,k + pklnw
then maximizing UBI,k yields the optimal tax rate t
BI
u,k = pk.
4.2 Choice of the system
The Beveridgean system yields the following social welfare:
U∗BE = (1− p) ln(1− tBEu ) + p ln
(
1− p
p
tBEu
)
+ (1− p)lnw + p lnw
= (1− p) ln(1− p) + p ln
(
1− p
p
p
)
+ (1− p) lnw + p lnw
= ln(1− p) + (1− p) lnw + p lnw (6)
The Bismarckian system produces the social welfare:
U∗BI =
M∑
k=1
NkU
∗
BI,k
13Generally, in Bismarckian countries, tax rates differ across funds.
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where
U∗BI,k = (1− pk)
[
ln (1− pk) + lnw
]
+ pk ln
(
1− pk
pk
)
+ pk ln pk + pklnw
= ln (1− pk) + lnw
thus
U∗BI =
M∑
k=1
Nk [ln (1− pk)] + lnw (7)
The Liberal system gives the social welfare:
U∗L =
∫∫
WL(t∗; p;w)f(p)g (w) dpdw
=
∫∫
ln ((1− p)w) f(p)g (w) dpdw
= lnw + ln (1− p) (8)
The comparison of the different welfare functions leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 7.
A utilitarian planner has the following preferences: BE > BI > L
Proof. Comparing (6) and (7) gives
U∗BE − U∗BI = ln(1− p) + (1− p) lnw + p lnw −
[
M∑
k=1
Nk [ln (1− pk)] + lnw
]
=
[
ln(1− p)−
M∑
k=1
Nk [ln (1− pk)]
]
+ p
[
lnw − lnw] > 0
due to the Jensen inequality.
Comparing (7) and (8) gives
U∗BI − U∗L =
[
M∑
k=1
Nk [ln (1− pk)] + lnw
]
−
[
lnw + ln (1− p)
]
=
M∑
k=1
Nk [ln (1− pk)]− ln (1− p) > 0
U∗BI − U∗L is positive due to the Jensen inequality. 
22
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.18
Under the utilitarian criterion, the Beveridgean system is always pre-
ferred even if the distribution of risk is strongly asymmetric in favor of
low-risk agents (say, 85% of agents have a risk lower than the average risk).
If we compare BE and BI using a utilitarian criterion, two effects are
clearly in favor of BE:
– the vertical redistribution that benefits poor people more than it hurts
rich people,
– the global horizontal redistribution that benefits agents belonging to
high-risk groups more than it can hurt agents belonging to low-risk
groups.
Note that even if there is no inequality of income, BE is still preferred
because of this second effect.
Similarly, if we compare BI and L, the intra-group horizontal redistribu-
tion is only at work in BI so that it is preferred by the utilitarian policy-
maker.
4.3 Do the positive results meet the normative recommen-
dations?
In order to compare the results obtained under both criteria, we need to eval-
uate the impact of every redistribution mechanism (vertical and horizontal)
either with our positive or normative criterion.
A utilitarian planner is in favor of vertical redistribution since it benefits
low income agents more than it hurts high income agents. This argues for
BE rather than for BI or L. Similarly, the majority voting rule supports
any vertical redistribution because high income agents are a minority in the
society. Again, this argues for BE.
On the one hand, a utilitarian planner is also in favor of any horizontal
redistribution since it benefits high-risk agents more than it hurts low-risk
agents. This argues for BE or BI rather than L. On the other hand, the
majority voting rule does not support any horizontal redistribution because
high-risk agents constitute a minority in the society. This argues for L.
In addition, the utilitarian planner gives priority to global horizontal
redistribution compared to intra-group horizontal redistribution since the
first one is a broader type of redistribution. This argues for BE against
BI. The intra-group horizontal redistribution is preferred under a majority
voting rule if and only if there is a majority of agents in “good groups”, i.e.
Group k such that pk < p. This last case argues for BI.
As a consequence of all these redistribution effects, the utilitarian planner
prefers a more redistributive system, i.e. BE. The preferred system under a
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majority voting rule depends on the relative sizes of income inequality and
risk inequality as well as on the proportion of agents belonging to “good
groups”.
More precisely:
– the lower the income inequality, the higher the political support for L,
– the higher the income inequality, the higher the political support for
BE,
so that the majority voting choice corresponds to the utilitarian choice if
the inequality of income is sufficiently high.
Moreover, the higher the proportion of agents belonging to “good groups”,
the higher the political support for BI. More precisely, when comparing BE
and BI, a majority voting rule leads to adopt BI if the inequality of income
is low, which is in opposition to the utilitarian choice.
Finally, when only BI and L are compared, the utilitarian criterion leads
to prefer BI since it allows horizontal redistribution. This is in opposition
to the result with majority voting, since with pm < p only a minority of the
society benefits from horizontal redistribution.
5 Conclusion
We have studied the three main types of welfare capitalism within a sim-
ple economic model which incorporates specific groups. In particular, we
have introduced a more accurate way to model the corporatist Bismarck-
ian system, taking into account the fact that this system allows intra-group
horizontal redistribution, as outlined by Esping-Andersen (1990).
For the choice of the welfare system using the majority voting rule, we
have shown the influence of the inequality of income, distribution of risk and
the group structure. Under a utilitarian criterion, the Beveridgean system is
always preferred. Moreover, the Bismarckian is always preferred to a Liberal
one.
The utilitarian preference for the Beveridgean system may explain the
evolution of the Bismarckian countries towards mixed systems incorporating
an increasing part of Beveridgean characteristics.
This paper offers preliminary results which allows us to state that the
main results concerning the choice of the welfare system are crucially modi-
fied under the new way of modeling the Bismarckian system. This is a first
step in a research program that should be encompassed by the development
of new studies incorporating this new way of modeling.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
According to (4) and (5), WBIk (t
∗
m, pi, wi) > W
L(t∗i , pi, wi) is equivalent to
(1− pi) ln (1− pm) + pi ln
(
1− pk
pk
pm
)
> ln (1− pi) (9)
We set
hk (pi) = (1− pi) ln (1− pm) + pi ln
(
1− pk
pk
pm
)
− ln (1− pi)
= ln (1− pm) + pi ln
(
1− pk
pk
pm
1− pm
)
− ln (1− pi)
We have
hk (0) = ln (1− pm) < 0 and hk (1)→ +∞
and
h′k(pi) =
1
1− pi + ln
(
1− pk
pk
pm
1− pm
)
;
h′′k(pi) =
1
(1− pi)2
> 0
hk is a convex function on [0, 1), with hk (0) < 0 and limp→1 hk (p) = +∞ so
that there is clearly a unique p̂k such that hk(p̂k) = 0. Note that p̂k depends
only on pk and pm.
In addition, hk(p̂k) = ln (1− pm) + p̂k ln
(
1−pk
pk
pm
1−pm
)
− ln (1− p̂k) = 0
According to the implicit function theorem, ∂p̂k∂pk
= −
(
∂hk
∂p̂k
)−1 × ∂hk∂pk > 0,
and pk is an increasing function of k, so that p̂k is an increasing function of
k.
B Proof of Proposition 3
According to (3) and (5) we have
H (pi, wi) = W
BE(t∗m, pi, wi)−WL(t∗i , pi, wi)
= (1− pi) ln [(1− pm)wi] + pi ln
(
1− p
p
pmw
)
− ln [(1− pi)wi]
= ln (1− pm)− ln (1− pi) + pi ln
(
1− p
p
pm
1− pm
w
wi
)
25
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.18
Moreover, H (pi, wi) = 0⇔ ln
(
1−p
p
pm
1−pm
w
wi
)
= 1pi ln
(
1−pi
1−pm
)
i.e. H (pi, wi) = 0⇔ 1−pp pm1−pm wwi =
(
1−pi
1−pm
)1/pi
Then, an agent i prefers BE to L iff H (pi, wi) ≥ 0, i.e. iff wi ≤ ŵ(pi), where
ŵ(pi) =
1−p
p
pm
1−pmw
(
1−pm
1−pi
)1/pi
Let us show that ŵ(pi) is an increasing function of pi, with ŵ(0) = 0 and
limp→1 ŵ(p) = +∞
ŵ(pi) = C×exp (a(pi)), where C = 1−pp pm1−pmw > 0 and a(pi) = 1pi ln
(
1−pm
1−pi
)
Clearly, we can write that a(0) = limpi→0 a(pi) = −∞, and
a(1) = limpi→1 a(pi) = +∞, thus ŵ(0) = 0 and ŵ(1) = +∞
We just have to show that a(pi) is an increasing function of pi.
a(pi) =
1
pi
ln (1− pm)− 1
pi
ln(1− pi)
a′(pi) = − 1
p2i
ln (1− pm) + 1
p2i
ln(1− pi) + 1
pi(1− pi)
p2i a
′(pi) = − ln (1− pm) + ln(1− pi) + pi
(1− pi)
= −1− ln (1− pm) + ln(1− pi) + 1
(1− pi)
Let us show that p2i a
′(pi) ≥ 0 for any pi ∈ [0; 1].
We set b(pi) = p
2
i a
′(pi) = −1− ln (1− pm) + ln(1− pi) + 1(1−pi) where
b′(pi) = −11−pi +
1
(1−pi)2 =
pi
(1−pi)2 > 0 and b(0) = − ln (1− pm) > 0
Thus b(pi) > 0 on pi ∈ [0; 1], so that p2i a′(pi) > 0 and a(pi) is an increasing
function of pi. 
C Proof of Proposition 4
(i) According to Proposition 1, an agent i of Group k prefers BE to BI iff
wi < rkw where r1 < ... < rj < 1 < rj+1 < ... < rM .
By assumption, rjw < winf , then for any agent i of Group k with k ≤ j,
we have wi ≥ winf > rjw ≥ rkw. Thus, there is unanimity in favor of BI in
Groups 1, 2, ..., j.
Similarly, by assumption, wsup < rj+1w, then for any agent i of Group k
with k ≥ j+ 1, we have wi ≤ wsup < rj+1w ≤ rkw. Thus there is unanimity
in favor of BE in Groups j + 1, ..., M .
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(ii) Impact of an MPS.
– For k ≤ j, the agent i prefers BE iff wi < rkw, where rk < 1.
With an MPS, the proportion of people with wi < rkw increases, so
that the political support for BE increases.
– For k ≥ j + 1, the agent i prefers BI iff wi > rkw, where rk > 1.
With an MPS, the proportion of people with wi > rkw increases, so
that the political support for BI increases.
(iii) Impact of a sufficiently large MPS.
– For k ≤ j, with a large MPS, the proportion of people of income
wi ∈ [rkw;w] becomes very small, so that the proportion in favor of
BE becomes arbitrarily near that of people of income wi < w.
– For k ≥ j + 1, with a large MPS, the proportion of people of income
wi ∈ [w; rkw] becomes very small, so that the proportion in favor of
BI becomes arbitrarily near that of people of income wi > w.
Finally, whatever the group, if the MPS is sufficiently large, then the
proportion of people in favor of BE is arbitrarily close to the proportion of
people of income wi < w. Since the median income wm. is lower than w,
we can conclude that with a sufficiently large MPS, there is a majority of
people in favor of BE against BI.
D Proof of Proposition 6
(i) For any agent i of risk pi and income wi:
H (pi, wi) = W
BE(t∗m, pi, wi)−WL(t∗i , pi, wi)
= ln (1− pm)− ln (1− pi) + pi ln
(
1− p
p
pm
1− pm
)
+ pi ln
(
w
wi
)
= h˜(pi) + pi ln
(
w
wi
)
where h˜(pi) = ln (1− pm)− ln (1− pi) + pi ln
(
1−p
p
pm
1−pm
)
For an individual of income w and risk pi, h˜(pi) is the difference of welfares
under BE and L.
h˜′′(pi) = 1(1−pi)2 > 0, and h˜(0) = ln(1− pm) < 0, and
h˜(pm) = pm ln
(
1−p
p
pm
1−pm
)
< 0 because pm < p.
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h˜ is a convex function with h˜(0) < 0 and h˜(pm) < 0, thus h˜(pi) < 0 for all
pi ≤ pm. h˜ is a continuous function, then max0≤p≤pm h˜(p) < 0.
Setting η = exp
[
max0≤p≤pm h˜(p)
]
, we have then 0 < η < 1. By assumption,
η < winfw , thus max0≤p≤pm h˜(p) < ln
(
winf
w
)
For every pi, with pi ≤ pm, we have H (pi, wi) = h˜(pi) + pi ln
(
w
wi
)
≤
max0≤p≤pm h˜(p) + ln
(
w
winf
)
< 0
Then, any agent i such that pi ≤ pm prefers L to BE, i.e. a majority of
people are in favor of L.
(ii) An MPS implies that ln
(
w
w
)
increases for a majority of people be-
cause wm < w, thus it increases the political support for the Beveridgean
system.
(iii) With a sufficiently large MPS of the distribution of income, we have
pi ln
(
w
wi
)
≥ pi ln
(
w
wm
)
> −h˜(p) for 50% of the population. Then, clearly
H (pi, wi) > 0 for a majority of people. 
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